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Abstract

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have an inherent lack of security and situational
awareness capabilities at the field device level. Yet these systems comprise a significant
portion of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Currently, there is little insight into the
characterization of attacks on ICS. Stuxnet provided an initial look at the type of tactics
that can be employed to create physical damage via cyber means. The question still
remains, however, as to the extent of malware and attacks that are targeting the critical
infrastructure, along with the various methods employed to target systems associated with
the ICS environment.
This research presents a device using Gumstix technology that emulates an ICS
field device. The emulation device is low-cost, adaptable to myriad ICS environments
and provides logging capabilities at the field device level. The device was evaluated to
ensure conformity to RFC standards through the use of Triangle MicroWorks and that the
operating characteristics are consistent with actual field devices. The device was also
evaluated in that the device can respond as a PLC to common fingerprinting techniques.
The device was able to respond according to RFC standards and does respond as a valid
PLC to common fingerprinting techniques.
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EMULATING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM FIELD DEVICES USING
GUMSTIX TECHNOLOGY
I. Introduction
Industrial control systems (ICS) constitute a significant portion of the nation’s
critical infrastructure. The power grid, transportation, oil and gas, and public works
sectors rely heavily on the proper operation of control systems. A major disruption of
any of these systems may result in devastating consequences. The limitations in ICS
security have resulted in numerous failures, both targeted and un-targeted. In 2003, the
Sobig virus infected computers at the Amtrak dispatching headquarters, causing signaling
systems to shut down and halt ten trains between Pennsylvania and South Carolina [29].
The Slammer worm penetrated a computer at an Ohio nuclear plant in 2003, causing the
safety monitoring system to be disabled for nearly five hours [33]. Most notably, the
recent Stuxnet virus targeted specific operating characteristics to create direct physical
consequences [22].

1.1 Problem Definition
Attacks on networking systems follow a general pattern and can be categorized
according to the following sequential steps: reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access,
maintaining access and covering tracks [37]. During reconnaissance and scanning, an
attacker or malware obtains information about the targeted system. Security mechanisms
(e.g., intrusion detection systems, antivirus and honeypots) are employed in traditional
Information Technology (IT) systems to detect these malicious actions and provide early
indicators of potential impending attacks. For ICS, however, security mechanisms
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designed specifically for the ICS environment are presently minimal. Indeed, there is
lack of monitoring capabilities at the field device level. The field device level includes
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that control and monitor the physical operating
parameters. Security monitoring at these end points needs to be improved to detect
malicious actions and provide early indicators of potential impending attacks.
End system devices such as PLCs lack the inherent processing power, memory or
system capabilities to incorporate security programs. Additionally, the highly dispersed
nature of ICS operations requires extensive costs to retrofit security solutions. Finally, the
lack of logging capabilities inhibits forensic ability to characterize attack tactics that are
targeted towards the ICS environment.

1.2 Goals
The goal of this research is to include attack detection within ICS at the field
device level. Specifically, this research develops an inexpensive, configurable, and
portable emulation device that provides logging capabilities. The solution provides a
low-cost security device that can be readily configured for implementation across many
ICS environments. The PLC emulation device can be employed as an early detection
sensor, introduces logging capabilities at the field device level, and can help characterize
cyber attacks against ICS systems.
The emulated PLC should respond in accordance to RFC standards with any user
that may try to interact with it directly. Additionally, the device must be capable of
handling invalid traffic and respond to common fingerprinting techniques in a manner
that will emulate an operational PLC. The device must handle all forms of traffic and be
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able to record any interaction with the emulated PLC. It is also expected to evade being
fingerprinted as a Linux device while logging any interactions.

1.3 Scope and Limitations
The scope of this research focuses on emulation of Modbus TCP communication
of a PLC. The six most common functions used in Modbus TCP traffic are emulated on
the Gumstix technology to show that the emulation can be achieved. It is expected that
further functions of the Modbus TCP specification can be added in future development
iterations. It is also expected that additional protocols and services much like the
Modbus protocol can be implemented in future development.
The research is limited by the inability to access a full ICS operational system.
The test environment, however, is derived such that findings are expected to be consistent
with an operational ICS. Additionally, a common method to fingerprint ICS devices is
through Ethernet header manufacturer tags. These tags are represented as Ethernet
trailers in many common packet dissection platforms, such as Wireshark. Due to lack of
access to operational PLCs that implement the Ethernet tags, this technique is not
evaluated. It is expected that in future research the tags can be analyzed and readily
implemented.

1.4 Organization
Chapter 2 presents background information about ICS, ICS security and critical
infrastructure protection. The Modbus protocol is described along with related research
for ICS security measures. Finally, material on emulation in both the IT and ICS sector is
presented.
3

Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in this research. This chapter describes
the tests created to validate the emulation of the PLC device. Tests are compiled to cover
a variety of traffic scenarios a fielded PLC encounters.
Chapter 4 presents the results from the tests described in Chapter 3. The results
from these tests are presented based on each test scenario. The results demonstrate how
the emulated device responds as an operational PLC would respond to common
fingerprinting techniques used in ICS networks.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and future work for this research. This section
is followed by several appendices with material to both support the results given in
Chapter 4 and to allow other to reproduce the emulated PLC on a Gumstix Overo board.
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II. Background
2.1 Overview
This section discusses topics associated with industrial control systems (ICS),
critical infrastructure protection, emulation, and related research. The United States has
seen a significant and steady increase in cyber attacks on both traditional information
technology (IT) networks and ICS [20]. Some of these systems are crucial to our national
critical infrastructure, and greater efforts and attention are being focused on securing ICS
systems. Recommendations by the National Office for Cyberspace include working with
regulatory agencies to develop governing policies for ICS and also work to secure
government-owned critical infrastructures.
As an example of the emerging threat, Stuxnet demonstrated the damage that can
be caused by malware that targets ICS. Stuxnet showed that an attack on ICS networks is
possible and the effects of such an attack can be detrimental. Stuxnet was able to
manipulate physical devices connected to the PLC to operate outside their normal
parameters, sabotaging these devices [10]. Similar attacks are more likely as
organizations increasingly connect their ICS networks to their corporate networks,
providing additional attack vectors into ICS networks.

2.2 Industrial Control Systems Background
ICS manage, direct and monitor the behavior of large-scale, distributed systems in
the critical infrastructure sectors. ICS use central monitoring stations, typically with a
human machine interface (HMI) for an operator in the loop, to control and monitor
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remote processes [2]. ICS networks control critical infrastructure such as gas and oil
pipelines, electric transmission, manufacturing, and many other critical infrastructures.
Figure 2.1 shows the devices typical to an ICS network and their traditional
configuration. A Primary Control Center controls and monitors the overall operations.
Within the Primary Control Center is the human machine interface (HMI) station,
Control Server (Master Terminal Unit), Data Historian and Engineering Workstations.
The HMI provides the data to an operator in a Graphical User Interface (GUI).
The GUI allows the operator to interact with the field devices in such a manner that the
data is easily interpreted. The Control Server, many times referred to as the Master
Terminal Unit (MTU), presents data to the HMI while also transmitting data from the
HMI to field devices [19]. The Data Historian stores all the data that is reported to the
MTU; this data is used by the engineers at their workstations to determine the efficiency
of the network and billing purposes.
Figure 2.1 also shows a Backup Control Center which is a replica of the Primary
Control Center that can assume control in case of a potential power outage or natural
disaster in the region. The Primary and Backup Control Centers communicate through
radio signals and Ethernet-based communications to remote stations via specialized
protocols. The Remote Stations consist of field devices and the actuators and sensors that
are connected to the field devices.
PLCs are field devices that communicate with the monitoring stations and convert
digital control messages into physical actions such as opening and closing valves and
breakers, collecting data from sensor systems, and monitoring the local environment for
alarm conditions. There are several proprietary and open source protocols designed
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specifically for communications in ICS networks including: Modbus, DNP3, ProfiNet,
Ethernet IP and many others [24], [40], [34].

Figure 2.1: ICS network configuration [39].

The Regional Control Center is used in larger ICS networks to handle a
subsection of the network (e.g., power generation facility in a power company). These
control centers consist of a HMI and a MTU for local control of the network subsection.
The ICS network is commonly connected to the Corporate Enterprise Network to allow
authorized employees access to an HMI station, many times with read only access, to
view the current status of the network.
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The communication architecture for control systems uses a hierarchical, requestresponse paradigm for message transmission between a master control device and remote
field devices. The master sends request messages to the outlying field device to gather
data or to specify control actions. The field device collects discrete and analog sensor
data and maintains actuator settings specified by the master. Response messages are
generated by the field device after direct requests from the master. Additionally, the field
device may notify the master when alarm conditions are detected.

2.3 Modbus Protocol
Modbus, designed in 1979, is one of the widest implemented communication
protocols in the industrial control system environment [26]. Originally designed for
serial communication, messages are transmitted between a master and field devices. The
Modbus message format, depicted in Figure 2.2, contains three fields: outstation slave
address, Modbus application protocol data unit (PDU), and an error checking field (CRC)
[24]. The slave address identifies the intended recipient, with each device on the network
assigned a unique identifier. The application PDU is comprised of a one byte function
code specifying desired actions and up to 252 bytes for function parameters. The CRC

Figure 2.2: Modbus serial message format.
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field is used to identify integrity errors that occur during message exchange.
To leverage the benefits and cost savings of LAN/WAN technologies, Modbus
was modified for transmission to accommodate TCP/IP channels. Indeed, Modbus TCP
extends the serial implementation by enabling a master to have multiple outstanding
transactions, and an outstation to engage in concurrent communications with multiple
masters [25]. In addition to the original serial message data fields, a Modbus application
protocol (MBAP) header is added to facilitate IP communication. Figure 2.3 shows the
message format of a Modbus TCP packet. The MBAP header contains a transaction ID,
protocol designator, data length and unit id number. The Modbus data frame is
encapsulated as a TCP payload and transmitted using Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) designated port 502.
The Modbus specification identifies a common set of function codes. The basic
function codes implemented in the majority of systems are listed below, with the hex
representation identified in parenthesis. Note that individual implementation schemes
may use additional function codes designated by the standard for individual system
configuration.

Figure 2.3: Modbus TCP message format.
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(0x01) Read Coils - This function code is used to read from 1 to 2000 contiguous
status of coils in a remote device.



(0x02) Read Discrete Inputs - This function code is used to read from 1 to 2000
contiguous status of discrete inputs in a remote device.



(0x03) Read Holding Registers - This function code is used to read the contents of
a contiguous block of holding registers in a remote device.



(0x04) Read Input Registers - This function code is used to read from 1 to 125
contiguous input registers in a remote device.



(0x05) Write Single Coil - This function code is used to write a single output to
either ON or OFF in a remote device.



(0x06) Write Single Register - This function code is used to write a single holding
register in a remote device.



(0x0F) Write Multiple Coils - This function code is used to force each coil in a
sequence of coils to either ON or OFF in a remote device.



(0x10) Write Multiple Registers - This function code is used to write a block of
contiguous registers (1 to 123 registers) in a remote device.



(0x14) Read File Record - This function code is used to perform a file record
read.



(0x15) Write File Record - This function code is used to perform a file record
write.



(0x16) Mask Write Register - This function code is used to modify the contents of
a specified holding register using a combination of an AND mask, an OR mask,
and the register's current contents.



(0x17) Read/Write Multiple Registers - This function code performs a
combination of one read operation and one write operation in a single MODBUS
transaction.



(0x18) Read FIFO Queue - This function code allows the read the contents of a
First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queue of register in a remote device.



(0x2B) Encapsulated Interface Transport (EIT) - The MODBUS Encapsulated
Interface (MEI)Transport is a mechanism for tunneling service requests and
method invocations, as well as their returns, inside MODBUS PDUs.
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Consider, for example, communication from a master device to a PLC to close a
valve in an oil and gas pipeline. The master generates a request message that specifies a
write action with opcode 05 for address 01 containing data value FF to close the control
valve. The PLC performs the action and responds with a reply message containing
opcode 05 and address 01 to indicate completion of the action. Subsequent read requests
from the master returns a value indicating the valve is closed.

2.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) relates to the preparedness to an incident
involving critical infrastructure. In testimony to Congress by Gregory C. Wilshusen,
Director, Information Security Issues, defines CI as:
“Critical infrastructures are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to our nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitation impact
on national security, economic well-being, public health or safety, or any combination of
these” [11].
Critical Infrastructure is divided into 18 sectors based on Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) [13]. In HSPD-7, the President designates the
Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official to lead Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) protection efforts” and assigns responsibilities
to Federal Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs). The list of sectors and their corresponding
SSAs are provided in Table 2.1. This directive provides the criteria for establishing
additional sectors of protection in the future. Many of these sectors are very complex and
interconnected in such a way that if one of these sectors is disrupted it could cause
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disruption in other sectors. An example of this is if an attacker is able to prevent the
transmission of power to other facilities such as a manufacturing plant, production at that
plant halts. A similar condition occurred in 2003 when a fault in the power grid caused
an estimated 55 million people to lose power [30]. As a result, boil water advisories went
into effect, train service in the region shut down, airports in the region shut down, many
oil refineries on the east coast had to shut down, cellular communications was disrupted
due to cell towers backup generators shut off, and many large factories had to stop or
slow productions because of supply problems. Although the effects were not caused by
a malicious actor, the scenario demonstrates the impact to critical services.
Table 2.1: Sector-Specific Agencies and assigned CIKR sectors [5][6][28].

Sector Specific Agency
Department of Agriculture
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of the Interior
Department of the Treasury
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection

Office of Cybersecurity
and Communications
Transportation Security Administration
Transportation Security Administration
United States Coast Guard
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Federal Protective Service

Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources Sector
Agriculture and Food
Defense Industrial Base
Energy
Healthcare and Public Health
National Monuments and Icons
Banking and Finance
Water
Chemical
Commercial Facilities
Critical Manufacturing
Dams
Emergency Services
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Information Technology
Communications
Postal and Shipping
Transportation Systems
Government Facilities
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2.5 Industrial Control Systems Security
Control systems offer unique security challenges [17]. A primary benefit of
control systems is that remote and isolated locations can be monitored centrally without
the need for onsite personnel. From a security standpoint, however, this provides entry
points into the system that have minimal physical safeguards. Additionally, the trend to
interconnect devices using networking technologies introduces entry points, often via the
Internet.
The limitations in ICS security have resulted in numerous failures, both targeted
and un-targeted. In 2003, the Sobig virus infected computers at the Amtrak dispatching
headquarters, causing signaling systems to shut down and halt ten trains between
Pennsylvania and South Carolina [29]. The Slammer worm penetrated a computer at an
Ohio nuclear plant in 2003, causing the safety monitoring system to be disabled for
nearly five hours [33]. At the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant in 2006, a “Data Storm”
spike in traffic caused a PLC to crash, resulting in the failure of recirculation pumps and
forcing a manual reactor shutdown [42]. Most notably, the recent Stuxnet virus targeted
specific operating characteristics to create direct physical consequences [22].
ICS networks are connected to the Internet despite known risks. Leverett
discovered 10,358 ICS related devices connected to the Internet through a search over a
two year period from 2009-2011 [43]. Leverett used a total of 33 queries to find over
10,000 devices using an open source search engine, SHODAN. He also used Google’s
geocoding service to locate the devices by the latitude and longitude using the country,
city name, and country code. Of the devices discovered, only 17 percent implemented
any type of authentication [21].
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ICS networks require constant integrity and availability. ICS network engineers
typically have not considered confidentiality because the networks were primarily air
gapped. Integrity is important because valid traffic is necessary to ensure that a device is
operating within normal operating parameters. Availability is also very important
because the systems are responsible for critical services that require optimal uptime.
A primary shortfall in ICS security is the lack of ability to monitor and detect
malicious events at the field device level. PLCs have little memory, hard drive space, or
processing power and are not designed to execute additional applications. As a result,
there are minimal security mechanisms designed specifically for the ICS environment.
The lack of early attack indicators and logging capabilities impedes identification of
attacks and the ability to perform forensics if a system is compromised.
Encountered in many ICS networks are legacy system devices. It is not abnormal
for a system to be in use for 30 years in a traditional ICS network [19]. Many of these
systems must be in operation 100% of the time, so they cannot be taken offline for
system upgrades even when a security hole has been discovered. These systems are
typically left vulnerable for many years without replacement or upgrades.
ICS security has to deal with the challenge of bridging the gap between
Information Technology (IT) experts who know the traditional security solutions and the
engineers that configure ICS networks. IT experts are typically concerned about security
in the enterprise networks and the engineers are concerned about system availability and
functionality [19].
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2.6 ICS Security Mechanisms
There is a need to develop and implement a more robust security mechanism for
ICS networks. Digital Bond has developed an IDS signature package for four different
control system protocols [7]. The signatures are able to defend against known attacks,
malformed protocol requests and rarely used commands. There is a need to discover
previously unknown attacks to create additional signatures for the IDS. Note that the IDS
is designed for the perimeter network layer and not the field device layer.
Another research team, Morris and Pavurapu [27], established a bump-in-the-wire
device that is placed in a network to encrypt, analyze, and log each network packet. This
device is able to defend against response injection, command injection, and denial of
service on a control system. This inline system introduces the risk of compromising
availability of the systems it is protecting if it goes offline.
Many of the ICS security developments work to incorporate in a layer of
encryption. Balitanas et al. [1] look to add in a crossed-cipher scheme to increase
security through encryption with reduced delay in the system compared to IT encryption
techniques. The authors note that there are significant challenges when implementing
cryptography because of the time requirements of ICS systems and the time delay added
by encryption, decryption and processing time. Unfortunately, this solution would have to
be built into all devices and adds additional latency counter to requirements of real time
environments.
Other secure ICS architectures are described by Pal et al. [31]. The authors take
into account the limitations of limited computational capacity, limited space capacity,
low bandwidth and real-time processing. The architectures discussed each have their
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own advantages of key storage and distribution among field devices. Each of the
architectures requires a different number of keys to be stored at the field device layer
depending if the field devices need to communicate between each other.
There are currently inline solutions that have been created such as the EtherGuard
Encryptor developed by Ultra Electronics [41]. These products offer a way to help
increase security; however, if these devices are inline and fail they will disrupt the
availability of the overall system. Additionally, these devices introduce latency in the
network traffic that may be detrimental to the need to operate in a real-time environment
[19].
Stouffer’s Guide to ICS Security [39] recommends integrating security into
networks through network segregation. The first recommendation is to keep the ICS
system air-gapped from the corporate network. However, Leverett [21] has shown that
many networks are connected to the Internet with or without the network administrator’s
knowledge. Stouffer also presents multiple firewall models to create network segregation
if the network must be connected to the Internet. These models include: a dual-homed
machine (i.e., a system connected to both the controlled ICS network and the corporate
network), firewall between the corporate and ICS networks, a firewall and router between
the corporate and ICS networks, a firewall with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the
corporate and ICS networks and two firewalls between corporate and ICS networks.
Stouffer notes that firewalls are not the best solution but that the firewalls do provide an
effective baseline level of security.
Remote forensics on ICS networks has been demonstrated by Chavez et al. [3]
when they showed that Encase Enterprise can be used to perform forensics on ICS
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networks. Test results from this research demonstrate the feasibility of conducting
forensics on a field device without disrupting normal operations.

2.7 Network Attack
Skoudis describes a five step process for attacking a network: Reconnaissance,
Scanning, Gaining Access, Maintaining Access and Covering Tracks and Hiding [37].
Reconnaissance requires discovering as much about a target as possible. Attackers use
common fingerprinting mechanisms to find the machine they are attempting to
compromise. SHODAN, for example, allows an intruder to perform reconnaissance to
find a device vulnerable to an attack. The next step, scanning, occurs when an attacker
knows IP addresses of targeted systems and involves scanning to find potential
vulnerabilities. A common tool used for scanning systems to find more information
about the device is Nmap. Nmap determines which ports are open and potentially
vulnerable to attack. The next step, gaining access, is when the attacker uses an exploit
against a vulnerability to gain access to the system. There are many exploit databases or
tools that an attacker can consult to get a description of an exploit or to launch an
automated attack. Once the attacker has access they use a Trojan Horse or add a
backdoor on the system to maintain the access. Once the attacker knows that they are
able to maintain access on a system, they cover their tracks by installing rootkits,
modifying logs, creating hidden files and establishing cover channels.
2.7.1 Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting is a standard technique used to identify the OS running on the
target system. In control systems, fingerprinting is used to find the make and model of
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field devices [9]. In the reconnaissance and scanning phases of network attack,
fingerprinting of ICS field devices is performed in a variety of ways. There are four
identifiable elements on most field devices: known set of open ports through port scans,
known behavior of services through banner grabbing, Ethernet header manufacturer tags
and known MAC address space. Through the combination and correlation of these items,
a fingerprint can be produced for a field device.
2.7.1.1 Port Scan
Most PLCs operate on a select set of proprietary ports. Allen Bradley
devices, for example, run a proprietary protocol, Ethernet IP, over port 44818. If the
device is scanned and port 44818 is determined open, an attacker could conclude that the
device has a likelihood of being an Allen Bradley device. If a port scan identifies a
particular set of open ports, it is likely that the device is from a specific vendor. Devices
that communicate Modbus TCP have TCP port 502 open. Once an attacker discovers
open ports they are able to further fingerprint the device using banner grabbing
techniques.
2.7.1.2 Banner Grabbing
A device can be correctly identified through banner grabbing via known
responses on open ports. The SHODAN system, used by Leverett during his research,
was able to compile a list of responses from banner grabs against open ports on devices.
Banner grabbing on web servers is very common because many times information
obtained corresponds to a company that manufactures the device.
Modbus designated port 502 is also susceptible to banner grabbing. The Modbus
TCP protocol makes it mandatory to incorporate the Encapsulated Interface Transport
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function with the Modbus Encapsulated Interface type Read Device Identification. This
function allows any Modbus TCP connection to read very critical information about the
device. The mandatory objects that must be defined are vendor name, product code and
major/minor revision. The information returned from those three objects identify the
exact device and firmware.
2.7.1.3 Ethernet Manufacturer Tags
Digital Bond discusses how some devices have manufacturer specific tags
in the Ethernet header of response packets from field devices [9]. This field is placed as a
Ethernet trailer used to designate that the traffic is to a specific device.
2.7.1.4 MAC address
The last piece that can be used to fingerprint a field device is the MAC
address space of the vendor. Each manufacturer of Ethernet enabled devices is assigned
a MAC address range which can be used to determine the vendor of the device if the
fingerprinting is done on a local segment.

2.8 Emulation
Emulation is software or hardware that allows one system to imitate the behavior
of another system. This phenomenon is very common in the IT sector with the
development of honeypots. A honeypot is a closely monitored computing resource that is
intended to be probed, attacked or compromised. More precisely, a honeypot is “an
information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of the
resource” [38]. Honeypot technology has been around for many years on the Internet but
only recently has it been introduced in the ICS community. Honeypots were first
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discussed, in 1990, with the book Clifford Stoll’s The Cuckoo’s Egg and Bill Cheswick’s
“An Evening With Berferd”; the first honeypot was deployed in 1997 [38].
Honeypots are an effective way to detect intruders and to gather malware samples
to create signatures to prevent future attacks. Honeypots add value to the security of a
system by detecting and logging threats and allowing mitigations of such attacks. In a
honeypot, an inbound connection implies the system is being scanned or attacked. This is
the case because honeypots are intended to be dormant with no legitamate traffic sent to
the devices. Outbound connections usually represent a compromise of the system
because honeypots are configured not to send traffic on the network.
2.8.1 Honeypot Overview
There are two types of honeypots: production and research honeypots. Each
honeypot type operates in the same manner but are used for different objectives.
Research honeypots are used to gather malware for further analysis and creation of
detection signatures. Production honeypots add to the overall security posture of an
organization by detecting attacks and mitigating the risk of attackers [38]. Mitigating the
risk is done through many different means such as blocking inbound connections from
the specific IP address.
Honeypots mainly consists of two variations: low-interaction and high-interaction
honeypots. Low-interaction honeypots consists of emulated services and operating
systems which provide targets. These honeypots are easily fingerprinted as they only
emulate the basic services. High-interaction honeypots provide real systems applications
and services for the attacker to interact with. High-interaction honeypots are difficult to
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set up because they need to be secure enough so an attacker cannot use the machine to
attack other machines in the network [38].
2.8.2 Advantages of Honeypots
Honeypots afford advantages including valuable data, resources, simplicity and
return on investment [15]. The first advantage is the value in the data collected.
Honeypots only collect data when interacted with, making the data much more
manageable to analyze than traditional network logging systems. Additionally,
honeypots reduce the amount of false positives because any interactions indicate
unauthorized traffic. Honeypots are able to detect many more attacks because any
activity in the honeypot is an irregularity which makes novel attacks easier to identify.
This is more effective than alternatives that use signatures which require previous
identification of the attack.
Honeypots require minimal resources for employment. Honeypots can be set up
on aging computers because they have little interactions and typically do not have to deal
with resource exhaustion. Even large networks only require one or two systems to
monitor any kind of attack on the network.
Honeypots are also very simplistic. One does not have to keep up with signature
sets or rule sets; someone just needs to place the honeypot somewhere in the network and
then wait for the attack. Some honeypots are more complex but all follow the same
simple premise: if something interacts with the honeypot it is ilegitimate communication
and needs to be examined [38].
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The last advantage to honeypots is the return on investment. Honeypots are cost
effective because of minimal resource requirements. Honeypots also demonstrate that if
it has been attacked that someone has been able to infiltrate the network [38].
2.8.3 Disadvantages of Honeypots
While honeypots have many advantages, they also have disadvantages. The first
disadvantage is that they have a narrow field of view. Honeypots only see what traffic is
directed at the honeypot. If the attack is never directed at the honeypot it will never
detect the attack.
Honeypots are also susceptible to fingerprinting. Fingerprinting occurs when an
attacker can identify the true identity of the honeypot because of certain characteristics or
behaviors [38]. If the attacker can correctly identify the honeypot, he can avoid it when
attacking the network. While uncommon, fingerprinting can also be done if the
programming of the honeypot has misspelled a word somewhere which alerts an attacker
when the response is sent back to the attacker.
The last disadvantage is the risk that a honeypot introduces into the network.
While the amount of risk each type of honeypot introduces into the environment is
different, the risk is still present. Once a honeypot has been attacked and compromised it
can be used to attack, infiltrate or harm other computer systems in the organization or
other organizations [15].
2.8.4 Honeypot Attributes
There are three fundamental requirements of honeypots: data control, data capture
and data analysis. The first, data control, is used for mitigation of risk through the
containment of the activity of the attacker. This is accomplished by controlling what an
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attacker is able to do once on the honeypot. Note that it is important to make sure that
once the honeypot is compromised, another system cannot be compromised by it. A
common way to do this is with a fail-safe that prevents all outbound connections from the
honeypot once compromised. Honeypots should also alert when a system has been
compromised to notify an administrator of the event.
Data capture is the next fundamental requirement which includes logging and
auditing functions. The most common way to collect the data is with a layer two bridge
that collects any traffic that has been directed to or from the honeypot. Note that nothing
should be stored on the local honeypot machine to prevent fingerprinting information for
the honeypot to the attacker.
The last requirement is data analysis which is the synthesis of information
gathered from the honeypot. If multiple honeypots are implemented across a large
network spanning multiple time zones the information needs to be standardized and have
synchronized time stamping to correlate the data. This is important for analyzing the
attack methods to ensure continuity between collection methods [15], [16].
2.8.5 Honeypot Technology in IT
There are many different solutions developed for the IT sector. The following set
of solutions are indicative of current honeypots in IT. The first solution in the IT sector is
honeynets. A honeynet is a “high-interaction honeypot designed to capture extensive
information on threats “[16]. A honeynet is an architecture with multiple, networked
honeypots. Each of the honeypots in the network can be different systems ranging from
Windows workstations to IIS web servers to Cisco routers. Honeynets rely on the same
basic principles that honeypots follow in that they are not productions systems so that any
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communication with these systems is considered malicious. In the paper “Know Your
Enemy: Honeynets [16]” The Honeynet Project states:
“In many ways a honeynet is like a fishbowl. You create an environment
where you can watch everything happening inside it. However, instead of putting
rocks, coral, and sea weed in your fish bowl, you put Linux DNS servers, HP
printers, and Juniper routers in your honeynet architecture. Just as a fish interacts
with the elements in your fishbowl, intruders interact with your honeypots”[16].
Figure 2.4 shows an example of a typical network configuration of a honeynet. The most
critical component to a honeynet is a Honeywall.
A Honeywall is a transparent bridge that is setup to enable data capture, data
control and data analysis. Honeywall is configured with three interfaces, two for the

Figure 2.4: Network setup for Honeynet [16].
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transparent bridge and one for management. A transparent bridge has no IP address so all
the traffic passes promiscuously through the device. The third interface is configured for
th management network to enable remote control of the Honeywall. Honeywall limits
malware damage by implementing a fencelist (i.e., a list of IP’s for non-target computers
which honeypots on the LAN cannot communicate with). Honeywall uses snort-inline
[23] as an intrusion protection system to prevent attackers from sending known exploits
to other machines once the machine is compromised. The number of connections out is
typically filtered from the Honeywall to prevent too much activity once the box has been
compromised. Honeywall also uses the monitoring system Sebek [35].
Sebek is a client-server data capture tool which closely monitors and logs all user
activity. Sebek replaces several common system calls which can then observe all
accessed data [35]. Sebek is a kernel-level rootkit which hooks and replaces common
calls. Sebek has the following capabilities: record keystrokes of a session that is using
encryption, recover files copied with SCP, capture passwords used to log in to remote

Figure 2.5: Typical Sebek deployment [14].
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system, recover passwords used to enable Burneye protected binaries and accomplish
many other forensics related tasks [14]. In Figure 2.5, the client module is installed on
the honeypot A. The attacker’s activity captured by the honeypot is then sent to the
network and passively collected by the server (Honeywall Gateway). Sebek data is not
stored on the target, but rather transmitted via UDP to the sniffing honeywall or
designated log server. Packets are masked from the attacker, even if a sniffer is run on
the target through the use of a special Kernel module created to interact directly with the
network device driver instead of using the TCP/IP stack [14].
Honeyd is another common honeypot solution. Honeyd is an open source lowinteraction virtual honeypot. Honeyd has the capability to simulate thousands of virtual
systems on one single physical system. Figure 2.6 shows a sample configuration of
honeyd. Honeyd is able to provide arbitrary services, via a configuration file, that
interact with an attacker. Honeyd simulates each operating system at the TCP/IP level
which provides honeyd the ability to deceive Nmap into believing the virtual honeypot is
an actual operating system.

Figure 2.6: Sample configuration of Honeyd [35].
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2.9 Honeypots in ICS
Honeypots are useful in ICS networks to help improve the overall security
posture. Today there is no nominal way to detect malware running on PLCs. Consider
the case of Stuxnet which was on the PLCs for a year before being detected [10]. Indeed,
a honeypot for ICS would help identify malware currently in ICS networks and an ability
to study any future malware.
Honeypots aid in the overall security posture through prevention, detection and
response. Honeypots help with prevention by acting as an early warning of an attack. A
honeypot generates an alert for any connection allowing an administrator to block the IP
address and prevent the user from attacking any other machines. Some honeypots use
deception or deterrence to prevent attackers from further attempts to attack the system.
Deception involves making the attacker waste time on a honeypot that has no value and
deter them from trying to attack production machines. Deterrence is used when the
honeypot is coded to inform the attacker that the box they are interacting with is a
honeypot in an attempt to dissuade them from attacking the network any further.
Honeypots also add to ICS security posture through detection. Honeypots are an
effective way at detecting attacks through reducing false positives, false negatives and
through data aggregation. The last way that honeypots add to the overall ICS security
posture is through response. Honeypots collect all the data to and from the system so the
data necessary to respond to an incident can be retrieved by the incident responder. The
honeypot can also be taken offline for further analysis without affecting production
systems [38].

27

There are many IT solutions currently developed; however, these solutions are not
readily applicable to ICS networks. The IT honeypots are not effective because the cost
of solutions to disseminate across ICS is too high. Additionally, solutions that place a
honeypot in line with a production device creates a point of failure which could disrupt
the availability that is critical to ICS networks. Current IT solutions are also not
applicable to ICS networks due to the nonstandard communication protocols.
2.9.1 Current Honeypots in ICS
Even with the current landscape and challenges, some solutions have been
proposed for ICS networks. The first solution is a SCADA Honeynet that was started in
2004 utilizing Honeyd, simulating a limited set of services from a popular PLC [32]. The
goals of this project were to create a framework to simulate a variety of industrial
networks on a single Linux host running honeyd (e.g., minimal Modbus TCP functions,
FTP, Telnet, and web server). These servers are only basic simulations and offer a
limited number of functions to interact with. The work is no longer maintained; however,
a follow on was initiated by Digital Bond.
The work by Digital Bond utilizes two separate virtual machines. One of the
virtual machines is a modified Honeywall which implements Digital Bond SCADA IDS
signatures to detect malicious attacks against the second virtual machine [8]. This is an
efficient tool that can also be used in line with a physical device as well. Note that this
introduces latency and could fail causing communication to the physical device to fail.
The second virtual machine is a simulated PLC that exposes a number of services to an
attacker [8]. Digital Bond implements Modbus TCP protocol, FTP server, Telnet, HTTP
and SNMP servers. These services are much like the other project in that they only
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Figure 2.7: SCADA Honeynet configuration [8].

simulate the banner for the different protocols and minimal basic functions. Figure 2.7
shows the configuration of the two virtual machines from Digital Bond.
These solutions are both efficient solutions but are only designed for a particular
PLC or particular protocol. The solutions require more modularity to allow expansion
into the majority of protocols and devices in ICS networks.
2.9.2 Emulation Requirements
ICS honeypots have extra challenges associated because of the variety of ICS
networks. There are many manufacturers of PLCs, differing protocols, and systemspecific configurations for ICS networks. This makes it challenging for a single
honeypot solution to emulate a variety of systems. Additionally, each PLC has different
field devices ranging from sensors to valves. As a result, each PLC has a different
configuration to control each of these field devices.
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When a honeypot detects a new attack, an analyst can analyze it to create a
signature to input into the IDS to prevent the attack in the future [18]. This idea is
restated by the Department of Energy when they provided the “21 Steps to Improve
Cyber Security of SCADA Networks.” Number eight in the list is to implement internal
and external IDS and establish 24-hour-a-day incident monitoring [4].

2.10 Summary
This chapter explains ICS, critical infrastructure protection, emulation and the
current technology surrounding honeypots. It details current ICS honeypots and short
comings with the current technology. ICS honeypots need to be modularized and allow
easy reconfiguration. This chapter demonstrate the necessity for additional security in
ICS networks and how current IT solutions are not capable of protecting the vastly
different ICS networks. The next chapter discusses the methodology used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the ICS honeypot created as part of this research.
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III. Methodology
This chapter discusses the methodology for evaluating an emulated PLC to
determine if the device responds to basic network traffic and can avoid common
fingerprinting techniques. Successful emulation of a PLC utilizing Modbus TCP traffic
is contingent upon the device (1) correctly responding to standard traffic, (2) avoiding
being fingerprinted as a Linux machine using common ICS fingerprinting techniques and
(3) correctly handling invalid traffic.

3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis
The goal of this research is to include attack detection within Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) at the field device level through development of an inexpensive,
configurable and portable emulation device that contains logging capabilities.
It is expected that the emulated PLC responds according to RFC standards with
any user that may try to interact with it directly. It is expected that the device responds to
all traffic sent to the device in a valid manner and be able to log all interactions with the
emulated PLC. It is also expected to respond as an operational PLC to common ICS
fingerprinting techniques (i.e., Port Scan, MAC Address, and Banner Grabbing).
3.1.2 Approach
This research determines the effectiveness of the emulated PLC at emulating an
operational PLC. Allen Bradley PLCs are used as a baseline for fingerprinting tests and
invalid traffic tests while the Modbus TCP RFC is used as the baseline for standard
traffic response tests. The emulated PLC is evaluated to see how responses compare with
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the baseline and if the interaction is logged. The emulated PLC and Allen Bradley PLCs
are subjected to a variety of tests outlined in Section 3.3 to determine if the devices
respond in the appropriate manner with the corresponding baseline. Analysis of the
results is examined to determine the effectiveness of the emulated PLC at detecting
traffic on ICS. Additionally, a qualitative analysis using Air Force ICS assessors is used
to provide a notional evaluation of the effectiveness of emulating an operational PLC.

3.2 Environment
Figure 3.1 shows the environment used for the following experiments. The HMI
is a Windows 7 64 bit SP1 machine running Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness,
Nmap and Wireshark. Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness is a package that has
been designed to test PLC devices to determine if they conform to protocol standards.
The HMI has a 500GB hard drive with 4GB of memory. The PLCs are a factory install
of an Allen Bradley Micrologix 1100 and an Allen Bradley CompactLogix 1769. The

Figure 3.1: Network diagram.
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emulated PLC is an Overo Earth COM Gumstix. Gumstix is a mini computer, not
surprisingly, about the size of a stick of gum (see the bottom of Figure 3.2). It runs a
Linux based platform using the Open Embedded framework and costs approximately
$200 [12]. The Gumstix board has an ARM Cortex-A8 CPU, 512MB of flash memory
and 512MB of RAM with a microSD card slot to be used as non-volatile storage. In the
case of this research, an 8GB microSD card is used. Gumstix computers leverage
expansion boards to extend IO capabilities to a range of operations (e.g., GPS, bluetooth,
and 802.11 wireless). For this research, the Tobi-Duo expansion board (shown in the top
of Figure 3.2) is incorporated to provide a dual NIC configuration allowing a primary
NIC for ICS communication and another NIC for out-of-band logging. The Gumstix
Overo CPU board snaps onto the Tobi-Duo expansion board for quick connection. The
operating system is Linux 2.6.34 built and installed on the device. Appendix A provides

Figure 3.2: Representative Gumstix device.
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the steps required to build the emulated PLC. The logging device is an Ubuntu 11.10
Machine with a 120GB hard drive with 2GB of memory running syslog server capturing
the logging entries sent from the emulated PLC. The systems are connected with CAT5e
cable which supports up to 100MB/s connection. Figure 3.1 shows that both the
emulated PLC and the Allen Bradley PLCs communicate directly with the HMI. The
figure depicts that the emulated PLC can sit in a network next to any vendor specific
device (e.g., Siemens, Omron, Allen Bradley). For testing purposes, however, the PLCs
that are connected to the switch are an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100 and an Allen
Bradley ControlLogix 1769. The emulated PLC also communicates with the data
logging device through logs sent out the secondary NIC.

3.3 Evaluation Technique
3.3.1 Functionality Test through Modbus Traffic Emulation
The Modbus traffic test cases are used to verify the ability of the emulated PLC to
communicate in accordance with Modbus RFC standards. Although there are numerous
Modbus TCP standard function codes, the most commonly used include:







Read Coil
Write Coil
Read Discrete Inputs
Read Holding Registers
Write Holding Register
Read Input Registers
Each of the function codes listed above is sent in accordance with Triangle

MicroWorks and Modbus Poll evaluation process to the emulated PLC in order to verify
proper responses. The commands are sent in the order shown above with thirty seconds
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in between each packet being transmitted. Note that the focus of these tests is to evaluate
operational functionality; analysis on traffic rate limits is recommended for future work.
The following two software packages are used to test the emulated PLC against the traffic
standard:
1. Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness
2. Modbus Poll
Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness is a software package created to test if a
device adheres to the Request for Comments (RFC) for a given protocol. This checks the
response packets bytes to make sure that the packet is a valid packet. If the packet is
valid the Test Harness logs each response received, and if the packet is invalid the Test
Harness times out waiting for a valid response. Modbus Poll is a free software package
created to communicate with Modbus enabled devices. This software is also used to
communicate with the emulated PLC to see if the responses are considered valid.
The following steps outline how to complete each test case. First, the emulated
PLC is attached to the switch and the logging device using CAT5 cables. After the
device is turned on and both Ethernet NICs have been initialized then, SSH is initiated
from the logging device to the emulated PLC. The command ‘ifconfig’ is run to
determine the IP address of the emulated PLC. Next, the command ‘ps –ef’ is run and
then viewed to make sure that both tcpdump and the python script are initiated. On the
HMI, Wireshark is started to capture the network traffic to and from the emulated PLC.
The software indicated in the test case (i.e., Triangle MicroWorks or Modbus Poll) is
then started, and each of the six most popular Modbus TCP commands listed above are
initiated by the software. After the six commands conclude, the software and Wireshark
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are stopped and the capture saved for analysis. An SSH session is then initialized to the
emulated PLC and the pcap created from tcpdump is retrieved. The syslog on the logging
machine is also saved. The emulated PLC is then restarted to make a consistent starting
point for each test.
The emulated PLC is successful if the program used for testing is able to receive a
valid response from the device. The traffic is analyzed to see if the Modbus Wireshark
dissector is able to determine that the traffic being sent from the emulated PLC is
Modbus TCP. The test is not successful if the device does not respond in an expected
manner.
The emulated PLC must keep state as part of the functionality such that if a coil is
turned from off to on, subsequent reads indicate the coil is now turned on. This test is
successful if a second Read Coil response shows the coil has transitioned status. The test
is unsuccessful if the response to the second Read Coil shows that the coil did not
transition state.
3.3.2 Fingerprinting Test Cases
3.3.2.1 Port Scan Test Case
The intent of the emulated PLC is to act as an operational PLC and avoid being
fingerprinted as a Linux device. The most common way to detect a device is through
port scanning with a tool such as Nmap. Nmap is run to scan the device for open ports
but can also attempt to determine the operating system (OS) that the device is running. In
the Port Scan Test Cases the following devices are scanned:
1. Emulated PLC
2. Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100
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3. Allen Bradley ControlLogic 1769
These scans determine if it is possible to fingerprint the device as an emulated PLC
through scanning and examining the results against the scans of two Allen Bradley
devices that are configured to communicate over Ethernet/IP (port 44818). The Allen
Bradley devices do not communicate over Modbus TCP so the devices do not have port
502 open as the emulated PLC; however, they do have a standard ICS communication
protocol (Ethernet/IP port 44818) that is open in the same manner as the Modbus port for
the emulated PLC.
The following outlines how to complete each test case. First the emulated PLC is
connected to the switch and the logging device. Both Allen Bradley devices are
connected to the switch with Ethernet cables. After the emulated PLC is turned on and
both Ethernet NICs have initialized then SSH is initiated from the logging device to the
emulated PLC. The command ‘ifconfig’ is run to determine the IP address of the
emulated PLC. Next, the command ‘ps -ef’ is run and then the results are viewed to
make sure that both tcpdump and the python script are initiated. On the HMI, Wireshark
is initialized on the Ethernet port to capture the network traffic to and from the emulated
PLC and Allen Bradley Devices. Nmap is also initialized on the HMI. An Intense Scan
including all TCP ports is done against each of the devices listed above. After the Nmap
scan has completed Wireshark is stopped. The Wireshark and Nmap captures are saved
for analysis. After the scan of the emulated PLC an SSH session is initialized to the
emulated PLC and the pcap created from tcpdump is retrieved. The syslog on the logging
machine is also saved. Another scan of the Allen Bradley devices is also accomplished to
run the OS detection scan against just the ICS communication port and one closed port
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(e.g. <IP address> -O -p 44818-44819). The emulated PLC does not currently implement
a web server so the second Nmap scan provides a closer representation of what the
emulated PLC results should look like. Future work includes implementation of a web
server on the emulated PLC to provide a closer representation of modern PLCs.
The Nmap scan on the emulated PLC is successful if only the ICS communication
port, TCP port 502, appears to be open. If the OS scan on the emulated PLC results are
the same as that of the OS scan specifically targeting the open ICS communication port
on the Allen Bradley devices then the test is considered successful. The test is not
successful if the OS on the emulated PLC is not the same as the Allen Bradley devices.
3.3.2.2 MAC Address Resolution Test Case
MAC Address Resolution is a common fingerprinting technique common to ICS
field devices. The emulated PLC is tested to verify that the MAC address resolves to a
known ICS vendor. The Wireshark traffic from both the Modbus Traffic Emulation test
cases and the Nmap scan are examined to see if the MAC address resolves to a known
ICS vendor. The results of the Nmap scan are also examined to see if the MAC address
resolves to a known ICS vendor.
The MAC Address Resolution succeeds if the MAC addresses in all the
Wireshark captures are the same and resolve to a known ICS vendor. The MAC address
must also resolve in the Nmap scan to succeed. The MAC Address Resolution fails if in
any of the captures the MAC address does not indicate a known ICS vendor MAC
address.
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3.3.2.3 Banner Grabbing Test Case
Banner Grabbing is another fingerprinting technique common to ICS field
devices. This test case tests that the emulated PLC can respond to banner grabbing
request on the Modbus TCP port. The following states how to configure the emulated
PLC for this test case. First the emulated PLC is connected to the switch and the logging
device. After the device is turned on and both Ethernet NICs have been initialized then
SSH is initiated from the logging computer to the emulated PLC. The command
‘ifconfig’ is run to determine the IP address of the emulated PLC. Next, the command
‘ps -ef’ is run and then the results are viewed to make sure that both tcpdump and the
python script have initiated. On the HMI, Wireshark is started on the Ethernet port to
capture the network traffic to and from the emulated PLC. Triangle MicroWorks
Protocol Test Harness is then started on the HMI. The Modbus TCP command Device
ID is then sent to banner grab the information from the emulated PLC. This command
helps to correctly identify a device because the response sends information such as the
vender name and product name. Note that this command is a Modbus command and
therefore cannot be run against either of the Allen Bradley devices. After the command
has completed, Triangle MicroWorks and Wireshark are stopped. The Wireshark capture
is saved for analysis. An SSH session is initialized to the emulated PLC and the .pcap
created from tcpdump is retrieved. The syslog on the logging machine is also saved.
The banner grabbing on the emulated PLC is successful if Triangle MicroWorks
is able to receive a valid response from the emulated PLC. Successful emulation of this
command gives another way that an attack can fingerprint the emulated PLC as an
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operational PLC. The test is not successful if the device does not respond in a manner
that Triangle MicroWorks is expecting.
3.3.3 Invalid Traffic Test Cases
This test is used to make sure that when an invalid packet is received by the
emulated PLC it responds in the same manner as an operational PLC. This test
incorporates the emulated PLC and both the Allen Bradley devices.
The devices are configured as in Section 3.3.2.1 Port Scan. The only difference is
that Scapy is started on the HMI to allow for the creation of an invalid TCP packet to be
sent to each of the devices. Scapy sends an invalid SYN packet with a NULL TCP
checksum and then waits for a response. After 60 seconds Scapy then sends a valid SYN
packet verifying that the device is responsive. After Scapy has completed sending the
packets Wireshark is stopped. The Wireshark capture is saved for analysis. After the
invalid traffic to the emulated PLC has completed an SSH session is initialized to the
emulated PLC and the .pcap created from tcpdump is retrieved. The syslog is also saved
for analysis.
The invalid traffic test case on the emulated PLC is successful if the response
from the emulated PLC matches that of the Allen Bradley devices. The test is not
successful if the device does not respond in a similar manner to that of the Allen Bradley
devices. This test is emulating a standard IT practice of fingerprinting a device through
responses received to certain invalid packets.
3.3.4 Logging Capabilities
Logging on the emulated PLC is important to be able to capture any interaction
that an attack may have with the emulated PLC. The logging of the emulated PLC is
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tested in the Modbus traffic emulation, port scan, banner grabbing and invalid traffic tests
as described above. For each of the tests the number of packets captured on the emulated
PLC are compared to the number of packets captured on the HMI. The syslog on the
logging device is also checked for each test to see if each of the commands sent to the
emulated PLC are correctly logged.
The logging of the emulated PLC is successful if both of the following conditions
are met: (1) the number of packets captured on the emulated PLC match the number of
packets sent from the HMI and (2) each of the commands sent to the emulated PLC are
correctly logged.
3.3.5 Qualitative Evaluation
A qualitative analysis is conducted through work with a member of the Air
National Guard’s 262nd Network Warfare Squadron. The 262nd is based at McChord Air
Force Base outside Tacoma, Washington and attracts people from many tech companies
such as Microsoft, Cisco Systems and Adobe Systems. A member of this unit analyzed
the emulated PLC for fingerprinting techniques. The 262nd does ICS assessments on Air
Force networks which gives them the capability of comparing the emulated PLC to
operational devices.
The emulated PLC is provided to one of the members of the Air National Guard’s
262nd. The member uses their available testing environment and techniques for the
evaluation. The evaluation is considered successful if the member reports that the
emulated PLC is not distinguishable from an operational device. Note that specific
techniques used to evaluate this device are not considered important; the goal is to see if
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an experienced assessor determines the emulated PLC is consistent with an operational
PLC.

3.4 Methodology Summary
This chapter provided the methodology for evaluating the emulated PLC. The
Modbus traffic emulation of the emulated PLC is examined with: valid Modbus traffic,
fingerprinting techniques and invalid traffic. Modbus traffic is used to examine if the
emulated PLC functionality is the same as that of an operational PLC. Fingerprinting
techniques are used to study the case of an attacker scanning the emulated PLC. The
invalid traffic is used to see if the emulated PLC is able to respond in the same manner as
a PLC by other typical IT methods of fingerprinting. These tests are all accomplished to
simulate possible network traffic a device may receive when emulating a PLC. During
each of the tests, the logging capabilities are verified for capture on the emulated PLC as
well as remote logging capabilities. The qualitative analysis is conducted by an ICS
security expert who is able to give an evaluation on how well the emulated PLC emulates
an operational PLC.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Results of this research are organized as the following: Section 4.1 discusses the
development of the emulated PLC. Section 4.2 describes the emulated PLC initialization
checks prior to running the test. Section 4.3 presents the results from the functionality
checks with valid Modbus Traffic, fingerprinting techniques, invalid TCP traffic, logging
capabilities and the qualitative evaluation given by a subject matter expert. Section 4.4 is
the analysis of the results given in Section 4.3, and Section 4.5 summarizes all the results.

4.1 Development of emulated PLC
4.1.1 Architecture
Device implementations for ICS field devices more closely resemble cell phones
than traditional information technology platforms. Indeed, there are myriad vendors,
model numbers, configurations, chipsets and different operating systems/firmware for
each associated device [36]. While the devices are quite unique in platform
characteristics, PLCs that implement Modbus TCP conform to the RFC protocol
specifications in order to enable inter-device communication. Although the emulated
PLC does not contain input/output functionality for analog and digital signals to control
physical devices, it can be programmed to respond appropriately to Modbus
communications. For this research, the emulated PLC was programmed according to
RFC specifications to incorporate common function codes identified in Chapter 3.
The emulated PLC is incorporated into ICS operations similar to other PLC field
devices. Note that the emulated PLC can be readily modified to emulate various PLC
vendors (e.g., Siemens, Omron, and Allen-Bradley). PLC identification is determined by
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MAC addresses assigned to the various vendors. The emulated PLC can be set to
respond with any MAC address such that if correlated, it resembles the associated vendor
product. Additionally, the emulated PLC incorporates an out-of-band logging capability
to record and report on specified criteria (e.g., unexpected traffic patterns, attempt to
read/write unauthorized parameters and unexpected function codes).
4.1.2 Implementation Details
The program that provides the emulation capability was developed using Python
with the Scapy 2.2.0 module. Additionally, tcpdump is implemented on the ICS-facing
NIC to allow capture of network traffic and storage as pcap files. Syslog is used to send
alerts and traffic files to a remote logging device via the other NIC. The emulated PLC is
readily configurable to respond to operating parameters in the same manner as an
operational PLC. The emulated PLC maintains system state in the event that function
parameters are modified. For example, if a message is received to write to a single coil
(e.g., close a valve) and a subsequent message requests a read for the same parameter
(e.g., status of the valve), the emulation device will respond with the updated state (e.g.,
valve closed). Additionally, if an unrecognized function code or transaction message is
received, the emulated PLC responds with an appropriate unrecognized error code. If
traffic is received on a port other than the designated TCP port 502 (Modbus), the PLC
emulation device responds with a simple RESET ACK; however, the action generates a
logging event. Such traffic may be indicative of a port scan.
For logging purposes, any received traffic that is not consistent with pre-defined
parameters generates an event. Consider, for example, the configuration of the PLC
emulation device to continually respond to read requests for various defined parameters.
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The PLC emulation device is expecting to receive the message traffic precisely as
specified; any traffic not conforming generates an event. Alternatively, the PLC
emulation device can be deployed to a segment without a specific configuration for
expected message traffic. In this scenario, the PLC emulation device serves as a
traditional honeypot and can indicate attempts to scan the network for ICS devices.
Emulating a traditional PLC for open ports is accomplished by implementing
iptables to make all ports appear closed on the ICS-facing NIC, with the exception of port
502. The Scapy module generates packets from the PLC emulation device to craft
messages consistent with Modbus standards. Additionally, a startup script is included
that changes the MAC address to a specified value to correspond with a PLC vendor.
Banner grabbing is implemented for the Modbus TCP communication service emulated
on TCP port 502. For purposes of this research, replicating additional services to respond
to banner grabbing or other identified fingerprinting techniques are not implemented.
Future work for the PLC emulation device consists of developing such functionality.

4.2 Emulated PLC Initialization Checks
Prior to sending traffic to the devices in the test cases, the emulated PLC is
checked to validate that the necessary services are running. The services required are as
follows:





PLC emulation (canary.py)
Tcpdump
Network communications
Syslog

The detailed steps for verifying services are as follows:
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1. SSH connection is initiated from the logging device to the emulated PLC
a. Run the command ps-ef
i. Check the results and verify python and tcpdump are running
2. A command window is opened on the HMI
a. The command ping <IP address of emulated PLC> is initiated
b. The command window is checked for a valid response
c. The syslog on the logging device is then checked to confirm that the
packet is recorded
For each test the emulated PLC successfully initialized and the processes
correctly started.

4.3 Results
4.3.1 Functionality Test through Modbus Traffic Emulation
The tests from the two software programs emulating Modbus TCP traffic
demonstrate the emulated PLC conforms to RFC standards. Table 4.1 shows that for
each software package all six commands initiated by the test harness received valid
responses.
Table 4.1: Modbus TCP traffic tests.

Software

Messages Sent

Valid Responses

Invalid Responses

Triangle MicroWorks
Protocol Test Harness

6

6

0

Modbus Poll

6

6

0
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Figure 4.1: Read coil response Wireshark dissection.

The findings indicate that the responses of the emulated PLC conform to RFC
standards for Modbus TCP. Figure 4.1 shows the read coil response from the emulated
PLC correctly dissected in Wireshark, indicating a valid response. The correct dissection
of the response in Wireshark further demonstrates that the response adheres to the RFC
standard for Modbus TCP. Figure 4.2 shows the statistics on Triangle MicroWorks
denoting that all six responses are valid. The Responses Received field identifies when
the response is valid and conforms to RFC standards. Requests Failed, Requests Timed
Out, and Channel Errors indicate erroneous or invalid responses.

Figure 4.2: Triangle MicroWorks response statistics.
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The other tested functionality is the ability of the emulated PLC to maintain
appropriate state.

Figure 4.3 shows the request and response of the traffic dissected in

Triangle MicroWorks. The first read shows that coil 1 is set to off (0). The coil is then
turned on (ff) and the status displays on (1) for the subsequent read. The findings
demonstrate the ability of the emulated PLC to update and maintain state.

Figure 4.3: Read, Write, Read dissected in Triangle MicroWorks

The emulated PLC provides functionality for six Modbus commands according to
the RFC standards. The test used to evaluate the functionality of the six commands is
consistent with industry standards used to evaluate an operational PLC before deploying
to the field. While only six commands are implemented in this iteration, incorporating
additional commands is trivial.
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4.3.2 Fingerprinting Techniques
4.3.2.1 Port Scan
The port scan using the software package Nmap identifies open ports and
provides OS detection. When the emulated PLC is scanned with the intense scan all TCP
ports the results show TCP port 502 open and all other ports closed. The results are
indicative of a PLC device communicating Modbus on port 502. Note that the Allen
Bradley devices use Ethernet/IP as opposed to Modbus for ICS communication. Scan
results for both Allen Bradley devices similarly show a native ICS communication
protocol Ethernet/IP on port 44818.
For baseline purposes, an Nmap scan was performed against the Overo Gumstix
with the Linux image and resulted in ports 22 and 111 open and an OS detection result of
Tomato 1.27 (Linux 2.4.20). The Overo Gumstix was then configured to the emulated
PLC. The OS detection results is ‘none’ because the results failed to match any operating
systems in the Nmap OS database. A similar scan for the Allen Bradley devices also
resulted in ‘none’. The scanning methodology is indicative of an attacker scanning a
device to identify open communication ports and attempting to identify the OS to
fingerprint a device prior to launching an exploit. The findings demonstrate that an
attacker scanning the emulated PLC with Nmap would infer the device to be an actual
PLC due to the manner the emulated PLC responds consistent with a PLC
communicating Modbus.
4.3.2.2 MAC Address Resolution
The MAC Address resolution test demonstrates the ability to mimic manufacturer
device identifiers. Figure 4.4 shows that the MAC address of the emulated PLC resolves
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Figure 4.4: Read coil response Wireshark dissection.

to a Siemens PLC when examined via Wireshark. This is consistent with all traffic
captures associated with the emulated PLC; in each test the MAC address appropriately
resolved to a Siemens PLC.
During the Nmap scan of the emulated PLC, the MAC address resolution, shown
in Figure 4.5, also resolves to a Siemens Automation device. With the OS scan coming
back as negative an attacker examining the MAC address resolution and open ports likely
concludes the device is indeed a PLC.

Figure 4.5: Nmap MAC address resolution.

4.3.2.3 Banner Grabbing
The next common fingerprinting technique in ICS field devices is banner
grabbing. The Modbus TCP function code for Encapsulated Interface Transport-Device
ID x43 x14, allows a user to retrieve information about a PLC, such as the vendor name
and product code. For the banner grabbing test, Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test
Harness initiates the protocol messages. Figure 4.6 demonstrates a successful response
from the emulated PLC conforming to the RFC standard. Figure 4.7 provides the values
in detail for each of the three objects returned in response to the command. Device object

50

zero is the vendor name, object 1 is the product code and object 2 is the major minor
revision. The Conformity Level means that the information is basic information about
the PLC and the next object ID is only used if the information cannot be encapsulated in
one packet. The emulated PLC for the banner grabbing test is configured to appear to be
an Allen Bradley, showing the adaptability of the emulated PLC to emulate multiple
device types. The results show the device is an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1500 V1.12.1.

Figure 4.6: Triangle MicroWorks response statistics for banner grab.

Figure 4.7: Response to banner grab in Triangle MicroWorks.

Note that the banner grabbing is only tested for the Modbus protocol implementation.
As services are added to the emulated PLC (e.g., web servers), the device requires
evaluation of banner grabbing techniques for the service added.
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4.3.3 Invalid ICS Traffic
The emulated PLC was evaluated for the ability to handle invalid ICS traffic. A
SYN packet with an invalid checksum was sent to each of the PLC devices. As
demonstrated in Table 4.2, each device appropriately dropped the invalid packet.
Appendix C.3 provides screen captures of the traffic in Wireshark for each device. Note
that there is no response to any of the request packets. The second packet in each capture
is a valid SYN packet followed by a response from each of the PLCs. The results
demonstrate that the device is functioning and checks for valid TCP checksums.
Table 4.2: Response to valid/invalid TCP checksum.

Device

Response to Invalid
Checksum

Response to Valid
Checksum

Emulated PLC

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Allen Bradley ControlLogix
1739
Allen Bradley MicroLogix
1100

4.3.4 Logging Capabilities
The logging capability is designed to record any interaction with the emulated
PLC. The traffic captured on the emulated PLC using tcpdump and logged on a remote
logging device. During the valid Modbus TCP traffic, the connection with the emulated
PLC is logged, all six commands are logged and the connection tear down with the
emulated PLC is logged. Figure 4.8 shows the syslog entry connection and commands
from the Triangle MicroWorks functionality test.
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Figure 4.8: Syslog entries of interactions with the emulated PLC.

Appendix C.1 provides screenshots of all the packets captured for the HMI and on the
emulated PLC. Both figures show that there are 23 packets transmitted during the test
case for both Triangle MicroWorks and Modbus Poll, demonstrating the ability to
correctly log the interactions.
During the state functionality test, the emulated PLC and the HMI captured 14
packets. Appendix C.1 provides screenshots of both Wireshark captures displaying the
packets communicated across the channel. Figure 4.9 below shows that the logging
device is able to log all the traffic sent to it during the test. The connection and tear
down, both the read commands, and the write command are all logged.

Figure 4.9: Syslog entries from read, write, read test.

Logging is also examined during the port scan against the emulated device. The
number of packets captured on the emulated PLC is compared to the number of packets
captured on the HMI. During the intense scan of the emulated PLC, tcpdump fails to log
all the packets. The amount of packets that are captured on the HMI is 147,295 packets,
compared to only 44,838 packets captured on the emulated PLC. The device is able to
respond to all operational traffic; however, it is not able to log all messages. The
tcpdump records packets for approximately eleven seconds then ceases to log packets for
approximately fifteen minutes while it responds to the network traffic load. While not
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every packet was checked for a response during the test a look through the Wireshark
capture on the HMI appeared as though the emulated PLC is able to respond to all the
packets being sent to the device. It appears as though the CPU cycles during this period
of time are all allocated for the response to network traffic and the logging is not given
any of these cycles. This is a shortfall in that an attack could flood the device and exploit
the system without the events being logged. The syslog is also checked to see if the
connections to the device are logged. The syslog, much like that of tcpdump, fails to log
all connections and packets to the device. There are only 165 packets captured in the
syslog and one connection to the emulated PLC recorded.
Logging was also evaluated in the banner grabbing test. The traffic comparison
between the number of packets captured on the HMI and the number of packets captured
on the emulated PLC (8 packets) are equal for the command sent from Triangle
MicroWorks. The Wireshark captures from the HMI and emulated PLC are shown in
Appendix C.3.
The verification that interactions with the emulated PLC are logged on a remote
device is also evaluated. The connection with the emulated PLC, the request command
and the connection tear down are all identified and logged. Figure 4.10 shows the
connection and command sent from Triangle MicroWorks as logged in the syslog.

Figure 4.10: Syslog entries for banner grab.

The invalid traffic logging is also evaluated to see if the emulated PLC correctly
logged all interactions. The number of packets captured on the emulated PLC correlates
with the number of packets captured on the HMI (4 packets). Appendix C.4 provides
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screenshots of the captured traffic. The verification that any interaction with the
emulated PLC is logged on a remote logging device is checked. In this case, the failed
connection with the emulated PLC is logged and the successful completion of the SYN
with the valid TCP checksum is also shown in the logs. Figure 4.11 below shows the
connection and command sent from Triangle MicroWorks as logged in the syslog.

Figure 4.11: Syslog entry from invalid TCP checksum.

4.3.5 Qualitative Evaluation
An ICS Subject Matter Expert (SME) from the 262nd Air National Guard unit
evaluated the emulated PLC using assessment techniques. The emulated PLC responded
in a manner consistent with an operational PLC during evaluation. The individual stated
that based on the Modbus characteristics, operational parameters and interactive sessions,
the emulated PLC would have been considered an operational PLC typically encountered
during an ICS assessment. The findings indicate that an attacker attempting to exploit a
PLC target would not readily discern the differences between the emulated PLC and an
operational PLC. The ICS SME from the 262nd recommended inclusion of a web server
in the next iteration, as this is the service most used for remote access and exploitation by
malicious actors.

4.4 Analysis
The emulated PLC successfully emulates the six Modbus TCP commands based
on the RFC as tested with Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness. The emulated
PLC also maintains system state as expected in an operational PLC. The emulated PLC
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is responsive as an operational PLC instead of a Linux machine to three of the four
fingerprinting methods common to ICS. The MAC address of the emulated PLC is easily
configured to appear as a Siemens Automation PLC. Port scans for the PLC demonstrate
Modbus TCP server process and the OS detection is not able to successfully fingerprint
the device. The emulated PLC is able to successfully respond to banner grabbing
techniques used to fingerprint a device running a Modbus server. The emulated PLC also
successfully responds to invalid traffic in the same manner as other PLCs. Finally,
evaluation of the emulated PLC by a subject matter expert demonstrates the ability to
appear as a legitimate operational PLC to an external individual using ICS assessment
techniques.
The emulation of the PLC is successful; however, a shortfall is identified with the
logging functionality. The logging functionality failed to properly log all traffic during
intense port scan. The logging is able to catch up before the scan is finished, however,
that could miss valuable information during an attack. The logging capability requires
further evaluation. The other services during the intense traffic load also need to be
examined to evaluate if the performance of other services is degraded during this time.
Regardless, the demonstrated ability is an improvement over current logging capabilities
at the field device level.

4.5 Results Summary
The emulated PLC successfully passes fingerprinting techniques used to classify
the device as a PLC. The emulated PLC successfully responds to Modbus TCP traffic
and maintains the proper system state. The device also responds to invalid traffic in the
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same manner as legitimate PLCs. Although interaction with the emulated PLC was
appropriately logged, further evaluation is required to determine traffic and bandwidth
limits.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
This research introduces a novel approach to help secure ICS. The PLC
emulation device offers many capabilities associated with employment in the operational
ICS environment. The device helps identify reconnaissance and exploitation attempts
against an operational ICS. During scanning, an attacker attempts to identify available
systems on the network. Once identified, an attacker may attempt to manipulate
parameters to alter system functionality. In each instance, the PLC emulation device
identifies the attempted actions and logs the events.
In addition to identifying attempted exploitation, the PLC emulation device offers
situational awareness. Often times, asset owners have only awareness of network traffic
and operating characteristics as reported at the HMI. The PLC emulation device
characterizes network traffic patterns and identifies erroneous communications. Indeed,
the device helps provide holistic awareness of the system and can be used as an early
detection against propagating malware that is targeting ICS. Finally, the logging
capability provides insight into attack characteristics. By deploying PLC emulation
devices across a wide range of ICS, logging can be evaluated to determine attacker tactics
and techniques.
Although the PLC emulation device offers security protections against an external
attacker and malware, it is important to note that it may not be as effective against trusted
insiders. Because insiders have explicit knowledge of ICS operations, awareness that the
PLC emulation device is employed may result in the attacker avoiding communication
with the device. Regardless, the approach demonstrates utility for increasing the security
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posture for ICS. Indeed, use of the emulated PLC device affords a capability that is
inexpensive, configurable, portable, and offers event logging.

5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Further Protocol Development
Currently the emulated PLC only emulates a portion of the Modbus TCP protocol.
Follow on work includes development of the additional functions in the Modbus TCP
standard to create a more robust solution. Further development also includes adding
additional ICS communication protocols such as DNP3 and EtherNet/IP to make the
device.
5.2.2 Levels of Implementation
Follow on work for the emulated PLC includes expanding the current level of
services offered by the device. Currently the device successfully emulates the protocol
level and application level for Modbus TCP. The stack level is partially emulated
through the use of iptables and configuring responses in Scapy to respond in a similar
manner to ICS devices. Future work is to fully implement the stack level of a PLC.
Scapy can be used to fully implement a response for all iterations of packets. Working
on additional application level programs such as a web server allow for enhanced PLC
emulation.
5.2.3 Response Time
Future work requires comparison of the response time for the current emulated
PLC to that of a real PLC. With the knowledge of honeypots in the IT sector, response
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time is used to determine if an attacker is communicating with a legitimate computer or if
it is a honeypot.
5.2.4 Traffic Loss
During this research there was traffic that failed to be logged during heavy traffic
loads. Determining the reason for traffic loss and a solution to better handle the traffic
when it increases is important. Successfully capturing all packets is needed to help
determine the attack characteristics in ICS networks.
5.2.5 Ladder Logic and Firmware Implementation
The implementation of ladder logic allows enhanced emulation of a PLC. If
ladder logic is implemented, the devices the values on the device would be constantly
changing to help trick an attacker. If an attacker was scanning the network waiting to see
how the values are changing then the device could emulate the fluctuation of a pressure
sensor reading changing frequently.
Likewise is the ability to allow firmware updates to a device. While it would not
update any actual firmware, emulating the traffic to and from the emulated PLC would
make an attacker assume that he is interacting with a real PLC. Once the firmware
update has completed, the emulation will then save that state so if later the same attacker
attempted to scan for current firmware it would appear as though the firmware is the new
version.
5.2.6 Serial Implementation
Implementing an emulated device that communicates over serial lines instead of
Ethernet TCP/IP cables would be the next capture interface. Many devices still
communicate over serial lines and adding the capability enables the device to broaden the
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array of devices that it can emulate. Much of the communication that is discussed in
current ICS systems is the communication over Ethernet because it is readily accessible.
Serial communication would have to communicate through an HMI that could be
configured as a honeypot.
5.2.7 Ethernet Header Manufacturing Tags
Ethernet header manufacturing tags are another way to commonly fingerprint an
ICS device and this needs to be evaluated as future work. This also can be implemented
with the use of Scapy easily once the knowledge of the header tags in acquired.

5.3 Concluding Remarks
The primary goal of this research is to develop an inexpensive, configurable and
portable emulation device that contains logging capabilities. In order to properly emulate
a PLC, the emulated PLC device avoids common fingerprinting techniques specific to
ICS devices. This research develops such a device that is able to be expanded upon and
deployed to a live environment to better characterize and identify attacks on ICS
networks.
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Appendix A: Setting Up Emulated PLC

I. BUILDING OVERO OPEN EMBEDDED IMAGE
Guide: http://gumstix.org/software-development/open-embedded/61-using-the-openembedded-build-system.html
1) Build a new machine with the Ubuntu 10.10 x86 ISO file to act as the
development laptop.
a. http://releases.ubuntu.com/10.10/ubuntu-10.10-desktop-i386.iso
2) Once booted, use the Update Manager to update the default packages. Do not
upgrade to Ubuntu 11.04 or other versions.
3) Open the synaptic package manager and select the following packages for install:
a. git
b. subversion
c. gcc
d. build-essential
e. help2man
f. diffstat
g. texi2html
h. texinfo
i. libncurses5-dev
j. cvs
k. gawk
l. python2.7-dev
m. python-pysqlite2
n. unzip
o. chrpath
p. ccache
4) sudo dpkg-reconfigure dash
a. Answer No when asked whether you want to install dash as /bin/sh.
5) mkdir -p ~/overo-oe
6) cd ~/overo-oe
7) git clone git://gitorious.org/gumstix-oe/mainline.git org.openembedded.dev
8) cd org.openembedded.dev
9) git checkout --track -b overo-2011.03 origin/overo-2011.03
10) cd ~/overo-oe
11) git clone git://git.openembedded.org/bitbake bitbake
12) cd bitbake
13) git checkout 1.12.0
14) cd ~/overo-oe
15) cp -r org.openembedded.dev/contrib/gumstix/build .
16) cp ~/.bashrc ~/bashrc.bak
17) cat ~/overo-oe/build/profile >> ~/.bashrc
18) Close the Terminal window and open a new one.
19) gedit ~/overo-oe/org.openembedded.dev/recipes/images/omap3-console-image.bb
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a. Add iptables to the TOOLS_INSTALL section
b. Save and close the window
20) bitbake omap3-console-image
21) The Overo file system is built at: ~/overooe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/omap3-console-image-overo.tar.bz2
22) The Overo OE Linux Kernel is built at: ~/overooe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/uImage-overo.bin

II. RECONFIGURING THE OVERO KERNEL TO INCLUDE IPTABLES
SUPPORT
Guide: http://gumstix.8.n6.nabble.com/iptables-on-Overo-td663707.html
1) On the development laptop:
2) cd ~/overo-oe
3) mkdir -p ./user.collection/recipes
4) cp -r ./org.openembedded.dev/recipes/linux /home/<user>/overooe/user.collection/recipes
a. (bitbake looks at user.collection first. org.embedded.dev holds the
original copy)
5) cd ~/overo-oe/tmp/work/overo-angstrom-linux-gnueabi/linux-omap3<kernel
version>/git
6) make menuconfig ARCH=arm
a.  Networking Support
 Networking Options
[*] Network Packet Filtering (netfilter)
 Network Packet Filtering (netfilter)
 Core Netfilter Configuration
ENABLE [M] all options in this menu
 IP: Netfilter Configuration
[*] proc/sysctl compatibility with old
connection tracking
ENABLE [M] all other menu options
IPv6: Netfilter Configuration
ENABLE [M] all options in this menu
b. Exit
c. Save: Yes
7) ls –al
a. Check that date was made today
8) cp ./.config ~/overo-oe/user.collection/recipes/linux/linux-omap3/overo/defconfig
9) cd ~/overo
10) bitbake –c clean linux-omap3
11) bitbake –c build linux-omap3
12) The Overo OE Linux Kernel is built at: ~/overooe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/uImage-overo.bin
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III. PARTITIONING BOOTABLE SD CARD FOR OVERO IMAGE
Guide: http://gumstix.org/create-a-bootable-microsd-card.html
Guide: http://gumstix.org/how-to/70-writing-images-to-flash.html
1) df
2) umount /media/…
3) umount /…

IV. DEPLOYING OVERO IMAGE
1) On the development laptop:
2) Delete the current file structure, if any, on the EXT3 partition of the micro SD
card
a. sudo nautilus
b. Edit > Preferences > Behavior > Check Include a Delete command that
bypasses Trash
c. Select rootfs
d. Select all files > Right Click > Delete
3) Copy the contents of ~/overo-oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/omap3-consoleimage-overo.tar.bz2 into the rootfs partition of the micro SD card.
4) On the micro SD card FAT partition:
a. Delete uImage
b. Copy uImage-<kernel version>-overo.bin into /
c. Rename uImage-<kernel version>-overo.bin to uImage

V. BOOTING OVERO IMAGE CONSOLE
1) Power off the Overo board.
2) Insert the newly created micro SD card into the micro SD slot of the Overo board.
3) Connect a USB cable between the “Console” mini USB B port on the Overo
board and the development laptop with ckermit installed.
4) On the development laptop create a file called overo_serial.cfg
set line /dev/ttyUSB0 (Note: 0 might changed)
set flow-control none
set carrier-watch off
set speed 115200
set reliable
fast
set prefixing all
set file type bin
set rec pack 4096
set send pack 4096
set window 5
connect
5) Open a terminal and type:
a. kermit

64

6)
7)

8)
9)

i. take overo_serial.cfg
Power on the Overo board. You should see the boot sequence displayed on the
terminal.
Break the boot sequence when prompted then type:
a. nand erase 240000 20000
b. reset
Enter “root” as the username to log in.
To exit kermit:
a. ctrl-/-c
b. Type: exit

VI. COMPILING SCAPY FOR OVERO IMAGE
1) On the development laptop
a. Go to www.secdev.org/projects/scapy
b. Scroll down to the section labeled Download
c. Download Scapy’s latest revision
d. Unzip the folder to the desktop
e. scp –r <foldername> <IP address of gumstix>:/home/root
f. You will also want to move over the canary.py script
g. scp –r canary.py <IP address if gumstix>:/home/root
2) On the gumstix now type the following commands
a. opkg update
b. opkg install python-core
c. opkg install python-modules
d. mkdir /usr/include/python2.6
3) Go back to the development laptop
a. sudo scp /usr/include/python2.6/pyconfig.h <IP
address>:/usr/include/python2.6
4) On the gumstix
a. cd <foldername of scapy files>
b. python setup.py install
VII. COMPILING TCPDUMP FOR OVERO IMAGE
1) On the development laptop:
a. bitbake tcpdump
2) Packages will be built in: /overo-oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/ipk/armv7a
3) Copy the packages onto the Overo EXT3 partition
a. sudo scp ./tcpdump_<version number>.ipk <overo IP address>:/home/root
4) On the Overo console, install the package
a. opkg install ./tcpdump_<version number>.ipk
VIII. COMPILING BITSTRING FOR OVERO IMAGE
1) On the development laptop
a. Go to http://code.google.com/p/python-bitstring/downloads/list
b. Download bitstring latest revision
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c. Unzip the folder to the desktop
d. scp –r <foldername> <IP address of gumstix>:/home/root
2) On the gumstix
a. cd <foldername of bitstring files>
b. python setup.py install
IX. REMOVING UNWANTED PACKAGES
1) update-rc.d –f ntpd remove
2) update-rc.d –f avahi-daemon remove
3) update-rc.d –f portmap remove
X. CONFIGURING STARTUP SCRIPT
1) Create a file in the /etc/init.d directory called canary.sh with the contents below
#!/bin/bash
/etc/init.d/networking start
ifconfig eth0 hw ether 00:0e:8c:bb:1f:56
ifconfig eth0 up
dhclient eth0
ifconfig eth1 up
ifconfig eth1 172.16.1.10
/etc/init.d/sshd start
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 502 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 502 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP -p tcp --sport 22
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP -p tcp --sport 111
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-level 6 -m pkttype --pkt-type host -i eth0
iptables -A INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset -i eth0
iptables -A FORWARD -j REJECT -i eth0
nohup tcpdump -s 0 -i eth0 -C 10 -w /tmp/capture.pcap &
nohup python /home/root/canary.py &
2) update-rc.d canary.sh defaults 100
X. CONFIGURING SSH TO RUN ON ETH1 ONLY
1) cd /etc/ssh
2) vi sshd_config
a. Add the lines (These lines may be commented and you just need to
uncomment them.)
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i. Port 22
ii. AddressFamily inet
iii. ListenAddress 172.16.1.10
b. Restart ssh (/etc/init.d/sshd restart)
XI. CONFIGURING THE OVERO BOARD TO WORK WITH THE TOBI DUO
1) This is only needed if you have used the Tobi board to set up the Overo Board
2) Place the Overo Board on the Tobi Duo Expansion Board and power on the
board.
3) Once the board has come online (Detected by the blue light on the CPU stops
flashing) unplug the board and place the board back on the Tobi Expansion board.
4) Turn on the Overo
5) vi /etc/udev/rules.d/70-persistant-net.rules
6) There should now be three net device () lines in this file eth0 – eth2.
7) Edit the eth1 line so that NAME=”eth0”
8) Edit the eth2 line so that NAME=”eth1”
9) If you restart the Overo with the Tobi-Duo extension you should now be able to
SSH to 172.16.1.10.

XII. CONFIGURING THE SYSLOG SERVER
1) Edit the /etc/init.d/sysklogd file.
2) Find the line SYSLOGD=“” and replace it with SYSLOGD=”-rm 0”
3) You will also need to edit the /etc/syslog.conf file.
4) There is a line that starts with *.=info;…… -/var/log/messages
a. After *.=info; add kern.!=info;
5) After this line also add in the line kern.=info /var/log/canary.log
6) Restart the syslog service
a. /etc/init.d/syslog restart
XIII. CONFIGURING SYSLOG ON THE GUMSTIX
1) Edit the file /etc/syslog-ng.conf
2) In the destination section add in the following line.
a. Destination logging {udp(“172.16.1.11” port(514));};
3) Further down in the log section add the following line.
a. log { source(src); destination(logging); };
4) Restart the syslog service
a. /etc/init.d/syslog restart
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Appendix B: Canary.py code
#! /usr/bin/python
### Dustin Berman
### AFIT/ENG
### Masters of Cyber Operations, June 2012
### File Information
### canary.py
### Emulates a PLC with the following commands: Read Coil, Read Discrete Inputs, Read Holding
Registers, Read Input Registers, Write Single Coil, Write Single Register
### This will also log any connections to the syslog
# Imports
import logging, platform, random
import syslog
from struct import *
from bitstring import BitArray
# Designed with Scapy 2.2.0
logging.getLogger("scapy").setLevel(1)
from scapy.all import *
# Display the version of Python and Scapy being used
print "Python %s\tScapy %s" % (platform.python_version(), conf.version)
#Global Variables
numcoils = 100
numdinputs = 100
numinputregisters = 100
numholdregisters = 100
coil = ['0']*numcoils
dinputs = ['0']*numdinputs
inputregister = ['\x00\x00']*numinputregisters
holdregister = ['\x00\x00']*numholdregisters
vendorname = "Allen Bradley"
productcode = "Micrologix 1500"
majorminorrevision = "V1.12.1"
ipid = random.randint(1,65535)
# Dictionaries
# Need to add in all function codes here
function_code_enum = {1:"Read Coil", 2:"Read Discrete Inputs", 3:"Read Holding Registers", 4:"Read
Input Registers", 5:"Write Single Coil", 6:"Write Single Register", 43:"Encapsulated Interface Transport"}
function_code = {"Read Coil":1, "Read Discrete Inputs":2, "Read Holding Registers":3, "Read Input
Registers":4, "Write Single Coil":5, "Write Single Register":6, "Encapsulated Interface Transport":43}
# Modbus Header
class Modbus(Packet):
name = "Modbus"
fields_desc = [ShortField("transaction", 0),
ShortField("protocol", 0),
ShortField("length", 0),
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ByteField("unit", 0),
ByteEnumField("function", 1, function_code_enum)
]
# This will determine how to dissect the rest of the packet
def guess_payload_class(self, payload):
if self.function == function_code['Read Coil']:
return ReadCoil
elif self.function == function_code['Read Discrete Inputs']:
return ReadDiscreteInputs
elif self.function == function_code['Read Holding Registers']:
return ReadHoldingRegisters
elif self.function == function_code['Read Input Registers']:
return ReadInputRegisters
elif self.function == function_code['Write Single Coil']:
return WriteSingleCoil
elif self.function == function_code['Write Single Register']:
return WriteSingleRegister
elif self.function == function_code['Encapsulated Interface Transport']:
return EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest
else:
return Packet.guess_payload_class(self,payload)
# Read Coil Payload
class ReadCoil(Packet):
name= "ReadCoil"
fields_desc = [ShortField("startcoil", 0),
ShortField("quantitycoils", 0)
]
# Read Coil Response Payload
class ReadCoilResponse(Packet):
name= "ReadCoilResponse"
fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0),
StrField("status", "")
]
# Read Discrete Inputs Payload
class ReadDiscreteInputs(Packet):
name= "ReadDiscreteInputs"
fields_desc = [ShortField("startinput", 0),
ShortField("quantityinputs", 0)
]
# Read Discrete Inputs Response Payloads
class ReadDiscreteInputsResponse(Packet):
name= "ReadDiscreteInputsResponse"
fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0),
StrField("status", "")
]
# Read Holding Registers Payload
class ReadHoldingRegisters(Packet):
name= "ReadHoldingRegisters"
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fields_desc = [ShortField("startaddress", 0),
ShortField("quantityregs", 0)
]
# Read Holding Registers Response Payload
class ReadHoldingRegistersResponse(Packet):
name= "ReadHoldingRegistersResponse"
fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0),
StrField("status", "")
]
# Read Input Registers Payload
class ReadInputRegisters(Packet):
name= "ReadInputRegisters"
fields_desc = [ShortField("startaddress", 0),
ShortField("quantityregs", 0)
]
# Read Input Registers Response Payload
class ReadInputRegistersResponse(Packet):
name= "ReadHoldingRegistersResponse"
fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0),
StrField("status", "")
]
# Write Single Coil Payload
class WriteSingleCoil(Packet):
name = "WriteSingleCoil"
fields_desc = [ShortField("coilnumber", 0),
ByteField("state", 0),
ByteField("padding", 0)
]
# Write Single Register Payload
class WriteSingleRegister(Packet):
name= "WriteSingleRegister"
fields_desc = [ShortField("regaddress", 0),
ShortField("regvalue", 0)
]
# Encapsulated Interface Transport Request Payload
class EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest(Packet):
name= "EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest"
fields_desc = [ByteField("meitype", 0),
ByteField("deviceid", 1),
ByteField("objectid", 0)
]
# Encapsulated Interface Transport Response Payload
class EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse(Packet):
name= "EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse"
fields_desc = [ByteField("meitype", 0),
ByteField("deviceid", 1),
ByteField("conformity", 1),
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ByteField("morefollows", 0),
ByteField("objectid", 0),
ByteField("numobjects",0)
]
# Encapsulated Interface Transport Object Payload
class EncapsulatedInterfaceObject(Packet):
name= "EncapsulatedInterfaceObject"
fields_desc = [ByteField("objectid", 0),
ByteField("objectlength", 0),
StrField("objectvalue","")
]
# Error Payload
class Error(Packet):
name= "Error"
fields_desc = [ByteField("code", 1)
]
# Bind Layers
bind_layers(TCP, Modbus, sport = 502)
bind_layers(TCP, Modbus, dport = 502)
# Responding to a SYN request
def responsesyn(packet):
global ipid
#Write the connection to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' is connecting to the Honeypot Device')
#Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
ipid = random.randint(1,65535)
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].flags = 2
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = random.randint(1,4294967295)
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 1
response[TCP].flags = 'SA'
if packet[TCP].window == 1 or packet[TCP].window == 63 or packet[TCP].window == 4 or
packet[TCP].window == 16:
response[TCP].options = [('MSS', 1460), ('NOP', None), ('WScale', 0), ('NOP', None),
('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (0, 4294967295))]
elif packet[TCP].window == 512:
response[TCP].options = [('MSS', 1460),('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (0,
4294967295))]
else:
response[TCP].options = packet[TCP].options
del(response[IP].chksum)
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del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
# Responding to a SYN request
def responserstack(packet):
global ipid
#Write the connection to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' is closing the connection to the Honeypot
Device')
#Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].flags = 2
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 1
response[TCP].flags = 'RA'
response[TCP].options = packet[TCP].options
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
# Building a response to Read Coil
def responsereadcoil(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
if packet.haslayer(ReadCoil):
# This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of coils it requested.
if packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils > numcoils or packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils < 1:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Coil request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
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# This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of
Outputs is valid
elif (packet[ReadCoil].startcoil < 0 or packet[ReadCoil].startcoil > numcoils) or
((packet[ReadCoil].startcoil + packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils) > numcoils):
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Coil request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# Else the Read Coil was a valid command
else:
response = response/Modbus()/ReadCoilResponse()
# Write the valid request to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Coil
request')
bytecount = (packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils/8)
partbytecount = packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils%8
if partbytecount != 0:
bytecount = bytecount + 1
response[ReadCoilResponse].bytecount = bytecount
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = response[ReadCoilResponse].bytecount + 3
leadzero = (8 - partbytecount)%8
status = []
output = ''
# This is + 7 because each high order bit is the highest output address.
# (Look at Modbus Application Protocol Specification V1.1b at www.ModbusIDA.org)
current = packet[ReadCoil].startcoil + 7
# This will build each byte to be sent back to the master.
for x in range(0, bytecount):
if x == (bytecount-1):
for z in range(current,current-leadzero, -1):
status.append('0')
for k in range(current-leadzero, current-8, -1):
status.append(coil[k])
current = current + 8
status = ''.join(status)
# Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the
output string.
temp = BitArray(bin=status)
value = temp.uint
string = pack('!h', value)
output = output + string[1]
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status = []
else:
for y in range(current, current-8, -1):
status.append(coil[y])
current = current + 8
status = ''.join(status)
# Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the
output string.
temp = BitArray(bin=status)
value = temp.uint
string = pack('!h', value)
output = output + string[1]
status = []
response[ReadCoilResponse].status = output
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
# Building a response to Read Discrete Inputs
def responsereaddiscreteinputs(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
if packet.haslayer(ReadDiscreteInputs):
# This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of inputs it requested.
if packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs > numdinputs or
packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs < 1:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Discrete Input request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
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response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
# This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of
Outputs is valid
elif (packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput < 0 or packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput
>= numdinputs) or ((packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput + packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs)
>= numdinputs):
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Discrete Input request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# Else the Read Discrete Inputs was a valid command
else:
response = response/Modbus()/ReadDiscreteInputsResponse()
# Write the valid request to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Discrete
Input request')
bytecount = (packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs/8)
partbytecount = packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs%8
if partbytecount != 0:
bytecount = bytecount + 1
response[ReadDiscreteInputsResponse].bytecount = bytecount
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
response[Modbus].length = response[ReadDiscreteInputsResponse].bytecount +
3
leadzero = (8 - partbytecount)%8
status = []
output = ''
# This is + 7 because each high order bit is the highest output address.
# (Look at Modbus Application Protocol Specification V1.1b at www.ModbusIDA.org)
current = packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput + 7
# This will build each byte to be sent back to the master.
for x in range(0, bytecount):
if x == (bytecount-1):
for z in range(current,current-leadzero, -1):
status.append('0')
for k in range(current-leadzero, current-8, -1):
status.append(dinputs[k])
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current = current + 8
# Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the
output string.
status = ''.join(status)
temp = BitArray(bin=status)
value = temp.uint
string = pack('!h', value)
output = output + string[1]
status = []
else:
for y in range(current, current-8, -1):
status.append(dinputs[y])
current = current + 8
# Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the
output string.
status = ''.join(status)
temp = BitArray(bin=status)
value = temp.uint
string = pack('!h', value)
output = output + string[1]
status = []
response[ReadDiscreteInputsResponse].status = output
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
# Building a response to Read Holding Registers
def responsereadregisters(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
if packet.haslayer(ReadHoldingRegisters):
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# This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of registers it requested.
if packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs < 1 or
packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs > numholdregisters:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Holding Registers request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
# This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of
Outputs is valid
elif (packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress < 0 or
packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress >= numholdregisters) or
((packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs) >=
numholdregisters):
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Holding Registers request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# Else the Read Holding Register Request is valid
else:
response = response/Modbus()/ReadHoldingRegistersResponse()
# Write the valid request to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Holding
Registers request')
response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].bytecount =
packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs * 2
response[Modbus].length =
response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].bytecount + 3
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
# This will loop and add all the values requested to the status.
for x in range(packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress,
(packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs)):
response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].status =
response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].status + holdregister[x]
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
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response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
# Building a response to Read Input Registers
def responsereadinputregisters(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
if packet.haslayer(ReadInputRegisters):
# This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of registers it requested.
if packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs < 1 or
packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs > numinputregisters:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Input Registers request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
# This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of
Outputs is valid
elif (packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress < 0 or
packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress >= numinputregisters) or
((packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs) >=
numinputregisters):
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read
Input Registers request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
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response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# Else the Read Input Registers is valid
else:
response = response/Modbus()/ReadInputRegistersResponse()
# Write the valid request to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Input
Registers request')
response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].bytecount =
packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs * 2
response[Modbus].length = response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].bytecount +
3
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
# This will loop and add all the values requested to the status.
for x in range(packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress,
(packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs)):
response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].status =
response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].status + inputregister[x]
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
# Building a response to Write Single Coil
def responsewritecoil(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
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if packet.haslayer(WriteSingleCoil):
# This checks to see if the request value was valid.
if not (packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 0 or packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 255):
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write
Single Coil request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
# This checks to see if the coil number is valid
elif packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber < 0 or packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber >=
numcoils:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write
Single Coil request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# Else the Write Single Coil request is valid
else:
response = response/Modbus()/WriteSingleCoil()
# Write the valid request to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Write Single
Coil request')
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = packet[Modbus].length
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
response[WriteSingleCoil].state = packet[WriteSingleCoil].state
response[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber = packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber
# If the value is 255 switch the value to 1 else if it is 0 switch the value to 0.
if packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 255:
coil[packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber] = '1'
elif packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 0:
coil[packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber] = '0'
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
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response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
# Building a response to Write Single Register
def responsewriteregister(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
if packet.haslayer(WriteSingleRegister):
# This checks to see if the request value was valid.
if packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue < 0 or packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue >
65535:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write
Single Register request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
# This checks to see if the register address is valid.
elif packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress < 0 or
packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress >= numholdregisters:
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write
Single Register request')
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# Else the Write Single Register request is valid
else:
response = response/Modbus()/WriteSingleRegister()
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# Write the valid request to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Write Single
Register request')
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = packet[Modbus].length
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
response[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress =
packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress
response[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue = packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue
# This updates the value of the register to be changed.
holdregister[packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress] = pack('!h',
packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue)
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
def responseencapsulatedinterface(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()
if packet.haslayer(EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest):
# This checks to see if the request was valid MEI type
if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype == 14:
# Basic Device Identification Stream
if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid == 1:
# This must start with a 0
if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 0:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a
VALID Encapsulated Interface Read Basic Information Request')
response =
response/Modbus()/EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse()
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response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].meitype =
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].deviceid =
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].conformity = 1
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].morefollows = 0
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].objectid = 0
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].numobjects = 3
length = len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse])
#Building the objects to send in the packet
object1 = EncapsulatedInterfaceObject()
object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 0
object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue =
vendorname
object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength =
len(object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue)
object2 = EncapsulatedInterfaceObject()
object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 1
object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue =
productcode
object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength =
len(object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue)
object3 = EncapsulatedInterfaceObject()
object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 2
object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue =
majorminorrevision
object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength =
len(object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue)
response = response/object1/object2/object3
length = length + len(object1) + len(object2) + len(object3) +
2
response[Modbus].length = length
else:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an
INVALID Object ID code ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid))
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# One Specific Identification Object
elif packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid == 4:
if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid >= 0 and
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid < 3:
response =
response/Modbus()/EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse()/EncapsulatedInterfaceObject()
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a
VALID Encapsulated Interface Read Single Device Object Request')
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].meitype =
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype
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response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].deviceid =
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].conformity = 129
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].morefollows = 0
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].objectid = 0
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].numobjects = 1
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid =
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid
if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 0:
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue =
vendorname
elif packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 1:
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue =
productcode
elif packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 2:
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue =
majorminorrevision
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength =
len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue)
response[Modbus].length =
len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse]) + len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject])
response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid =
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid
else:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an
INVALID Object ID code ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid))
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 2
# The Read Device Code is not supported so respond with an error
else:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an
INVALID Read Device ID code ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid))
response = response/Modbus()/Error()
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
response[Error].code = 3
# The MEI Type is not supported
else:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID MEI
Type ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype))
responseerror(packet)
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
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response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + len(packet[TCP].payload)
response[TCP].window = 4096
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)
else:
responseerror(packet)
def responseerror(packet):
global ipid
# Build a packet to send back
response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()/Modbus()/Error()
# Write the error to the syslog
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID function code ' +
str(packet[Modbus].function))
response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst
response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src
response[IP].flags = 0
response[IP].ttl = 64
response[IP].id = ipid
ipid = ipid + 1
response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst
response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src
response[TCP].flags = 'PA'
response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport
response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport
response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack
response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + len(packet[TCP].payload)
response[TCP].window = 4096
response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction
response[Modbus].length = 3
response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit
# This will change the high order bit to one unless it is already a 1.
if packet[Modbus].function > 127:
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response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function
else:
response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128
del(response[IP].chksum)
del(response[TCP].chksum)
del(response[IP].len)
#sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet.
sendp(response, loop=0)

def response(packet):
if packet.haslayer(TCP):
if packet[TCP].dport == 502:
originalChecksum=packet[TCP].chksum
originalIPChecksum=packet[IP].chksum
del packet[IP].chksum
del packet[TCP].chksum
packet=Ether(str(packet))
recomputedIPChecksum=packet[IP].chksum
recomputedChecksum=packet[TCP].chksum
if originalChecksum == recomputedChecksum and originalIPChecksum ==
recomputedIPChecksum:
if packet.haslayer(Modbus) and packet[Modbus].protocol == 0:
if packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read Coil']:
responsereadcoil(packet)
elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read
Discrete Inputs']:
responsereaddiscreteinputs(packet)
elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read Holding
Registers']:
responsereadregisters(packet)
elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read Input
Registers']:
responsereadinputregisters(packet)
elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Write Single
Coil']:
responsewritecoil(packet)
elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Write Single
Register']:
responsewriteregister(packet)
elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Encapsulated
Interface Transport']:
responseencapsulatedinterface(packet)
else:
responseerror(packet)
elif packet[TCP].flags == 2:
#send a SYN ACK response
responsesyn(packet)
elif packet[TCP].flags == 17:
#Closing down the connection to a FIN ACK
responserstack(packet)
elif not originalChecksum == recomputedChecksum:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an
INVALID TCP checksum')
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else:
syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an
INVALID IP checksum')
return
## This is the Main Script
sniff(iface="eth0", store = 0, prn=lambda x: response(x))
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Appendix C: Emulated PLC Test Case Supporting Figures

Figure C.1: Traffic captured on HMI running Triangle MicroWorks

C.1 Functionality Test Through Modbus Traffic Emulation
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89
Figure C.2: Traffic captured on emulated PLC running Triangle MicroWorks
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Figure C.3: Traffic captured on HMI running Modbus Poll
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Figure C.4: Traffic captured on emulated PLC running Modbus Poll
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Figure C.5: Traffic captured on HMI during read, write, read test.
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Figure C.6: Traffic captured on emulated PLC during read, write, read test.

C.2 Fingerprinting Port Scan Test Case

Figure C.7: Nmap Intense Scan All TCP Ports, Emulated PLC
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Figure C.8: Nmap Intense Scan All TCP Ports, CompactLogix 1769
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Figure C.9: Nmap Intense Scan All TCP Ports, MicroLogix 1100
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Figure C.10: Nmap Operating System Scan on Ethernet/IP port ControlLogix 1769
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Figure C.11: Nmap Operating System Scan on Ethernet/IP port MicroLogix 1100
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Figure C.12: Traffic captured on HMI from banner grabbing test.

C.3 Fingerprinting Banner Grab Test Case
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Figure C.13: Traffic captured on emulated PLC from banner grabbing test.

Figure C.14: Network capture of invalid checksum sent to MicroLogix 1100

C.4 Invalid Traffic Test Case
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Figure C.15: Network capture of invalid checksum sent to ControlLogix 1769
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Figure C.16: Network capture of invalid checksum sent to emulated PLC

Appendix D: List of Acronyms

CIKR

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

CIP

Critical Infrastructure Protection

CPU

Central Processing Unit

CRC

Cyclic Redundancy Check

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone

EIT

Encapsulated Interface Transport

FIFO

First-In-First-Out

GUI

Graphical User Interface

HMI

Human Machine Interface

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive

IANA

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

ICS

Industrial Control System

IDS

Intrusion Detection System

IT

Information Technology

MBAP

Modbus Application Protocol

MEI

Modbus Encapsulated Interface Transport

MTU

Master Terminal Unit

OS

Operating System

PDU

Protocol Data Unit
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PLC

Programmable Logic Controller

RFC

Request For Comment

RTU

Remote Terminal Unit

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SSA

Sector Specific Agencies
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